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I ARTICLES I

The Polyphonic Courtroom:
Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial
Discourse
Robert Rubinson*
"[T]o get somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the
suspicion, both your own and that of others, that you are not
quite getting it right."'

I.

Introduction

In a matter of such profound importance as the justification for
imposing judicial power, few would deny the normative goal of
maintaining as open a discourse as possible. As one means to an
open discourse, scholars have increasingly turned to the transformative power of "dialogue" to explore new legal meaning.2
* Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable contributions and insights of Anthony G. Amsterdam, Deborah
A. Batts, Sarah E. Bums, Peggy C. Davis, Robert L. Levy and Andrea McArdle. The author
would also like to thank Sarah Edenbaum for her superb research assistance. The author
is also especially grateful to Randi E. Schwartz for her suggestions, encouragement and
support.
1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 29 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for DiaMichelman, Habermas,and Civic
logic Standards in Postmodern ConstitutionalJurisprudence:
Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243 (1993); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismLaw,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuitof Pragmatism,100 YALE L.J.
409, 434 (1990).
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However, the central instrument for elaborating legal doctrine,
the judicial opinion, is a paradigm of closed discourse. As a
general rule, judicial opinions embody what Robert Ferguson has
called the "the rhetoric of inevitability."3 In other words, the vast
majority of opinions are written like briefs with the chosen result
as a client. An opinion will perfunctorily dismiss or diminish
alternative analyses, present facts as determinate and finite when
in fact they are carefully chosen to present a given story, articulate
standards in a manner favorable to the result and turn to other
standard methods of advocacy that students learn in their first year
of law school.4 Stated more broadly, opinions are typically
monologues which reject exploration of complex issues of meaning
in favor of the simple exercise of justifying a result.5
The consequences of this cramped state of judicial discourse
are profound and disturbing. The prevailing model offers judges
no incentive to openly explore meaning because of the operating
fiction that there is no meaning to be explored, only the "right"
meaning to be articulated and explained.6 Opinions thus ignore
how adjudication often entails hard choices among multiple
perspectives, each of which might have a vital, independent force.7
As a result, the actual considerations and range of choices available

3. Robert A. Ferguson, The Rhetorics of the JudicialOpinion: The Judicial Opinionas
Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 213 (1990).
4. For an extensive discussion by a judge of the techniques judges use to convince the
reader of the inevitability of a result, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70-89.
6. See, e.g., Wald,supra note 4, at 1417 ("while judges still typically write as if they
were absolutely certain about the rightness and soundness of their analysis and decisions,
everyone (including the judges) knows that's not necessarily the case"); Richard A. Posner,
Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1441 (1995).
According to Posner,
Judges are not comfortable writing opinions to the effect that, "We have very little
sense of what is going on in this case. The record is poorly developed, and the
lawyers are lousy. We have no confidence that we got it right. We know we're
groping in the dark. But we're paid to decide cases and here goes." Nevertheless,
this is the actual character of many appellate cases that are decided in published
opinions.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. Robert Cover's work is particularly insightful in setting out ways in which judges
avoid confronting painful choices their role demands of them. See ROBERT M. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED 232-36 (1975).
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to judges remain concealed-a loss that impoverishes the elaboration of legal meaning.'
The consequences of the monologic tendency, however, run
much deeper, extending even to the act of judicial decision-making
itself. By failing to explore meaning, opinions do not merely
conceal choices from readers, but mask (to quote Holmes) judges'
own "instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions" from the
judges themselves.9 In other words, monologic opinions promote
monologic ways of thinking, and monologic ways of thinking inhibit
discourse.
The working hypothesis of this Article is that this state of
affairs is neither desirable nor inevitable. Another normative
conception of judicial discourse, the "polyphonic model," holds that
a judicial opinion is part of a continuing dialogue whose hallmark
is exploration, not simplification. Under this model, opinions
should embrace dialogue and complexity, and recognize the
independent validity of multiple perspectives. Such opinions would
elaborate, not restrict and reduce, meaning.
However, the recognition of the merits of this approach is only
a first step towards realizing it. Obstacles remain because cognition
itself simplifies meaning, and thus it takes more than simple will to
write and think more polyphonically. Nevertheless, these cognitive
constraints themselves suggest potential strategies that could
intensify dialogue and thereby expand the scope of judicial
discourse.
This Article explores these issues in four parts. Part II draws
upon the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin in order to set forth a
conceptual framework through which to examine judicial discourse.
Part III conceptualizes judicial discourse as primarily monologic
and develops polyphony as a more suitable normative goal. This
part also examines representative judicial opinions which exemplify
both monologic and polyphonic approaches to judicial discourse.
Part IV explores cognitive obstacles to the recognition of a

8. Indeed, there are increasing numbers of critiques of the "rhetoric" or "style" of
judicial opinions. For an overview of recent scholarship in this area, see the Special Issue
of the University of Chicago Law Review on "Judicial Opinion Writing." 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1363-1520 (1995). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term Foreword:
The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 30, 117 (1993).
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881).
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polyphonic ideal. Finally, Part V suggests approaches that would
promote a more pluralistic, polyphonic model of judicial discourse.
Throughout this Article, I will focus my analysis on the
adjudication of "hard cases""0 in the United States Supreme
Court. I emphasize opinions of the Supreme Court not because
they present the only area where the scope of judicial discourse is
limited, but because they present an area where polyphonic
discourse is both distinctly lacking and urgently needed.
II. The Monologic and the Polyphonic
The work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975) offers
a powerful descriptive and normative framework through which to
view the current state of judicial discourse.1 Like many other
modern and post-modern thinkers, Bakhtin was concerned
preeminently with how language embodies and expresses meaning.
What is especially striking about Bakhtin's work, however, and
what renders it especially relevant to an examination of judicial
discourse, is his "extraordinary sensitivity to the immense plurality
of experience."12 It is this understanding that forms the foundation for one of Bakhtin's central themes: meaning is in a perpetual

10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 39-40 (1986).
11. Bakhtin's influence extends to "philosophy, semiotics, cultural studies, anthropology,
feminist and post-colonial studies, Marxism, [and] ethics." Pam Morris, Introduction to
MIKHAIL

MIKHAILOVICH

BAKHTIN,

PAVEL NIKOLAEVICH

MEDVEDEV

&

VALENTIN

NIKILAEVICH VOLOSHINOV, THE BAKHTIN READER 1 (Pam Morris ed., 1994). Surprisingly
few legal scholars have explicitly drawn on Bakhtin's ideas. For some exceptions, see Milner
S. Ball, Stories of Origin and ConstitutionalPossibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280 (1989);
Ferguson, supra note 3; Charles Hersch, Bakhtin and Dialogic ConstitutionalInterpretation,
18 LEGAL STUD. F. 33 (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW 107-37 (1985).
Bakhtin's work has only become widely known since the late 1970's. This relatively
recent discovery is due to, among other things, his imprisonment by Soviet authorities and
his own persistent uninterest in preserving his work in book or article form. Michael
Holquist, Introduction to M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, Xv, xxiv-xxv
(Michael Holquist ed., 1980). To add further complexity, it is unclear whether some
important early writings are the work of Bakhtin or of two other thinkers, P.N. Medvedev
and V.N. Voloshinov, in his circle. For a recent discussion of this controversy, see Morris,
supra, at 2-4. For purposes of this article, I will cite to works which are provisionally
attributed to Medvedev and Voloshinov, but I will continue to refer to the ideas as Bakhtin's
in the text.
12. Holquist, supra note 11, at xx. This distinguishes Bakhtin from other influential
participants-such as Wittgenstein-of the so-called "linguistic turn" of twentieth-century
philosophy. Id. See also MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOYEVSKY'S POETICS 26
(Caryl Emerson ed. & trans., 1984) [hereinafter PDP].
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state of "becoming.""3 Language is not the carrier of final truths,
working hypothesis for comprehending
but a means to present'1 "a
4
"
reality.
and expressing
A.

The Process and Content of Dialogue

Bakhtin's famous elaboration of the terms "dialogue" and
"dialogic" embodies the dynamic patterns of meaning that he
envisioned. To Bakhtin, "dialogue" is much more than a conversation. Rather, all understanding is dialogic because understanding
is by its nature responsive; 5 we elaborate meaning by "lay[ing]
down a set of our own answering words" in response to the words
of others.16 This dialogic process not only describes social discourse, but also how we elaborate meaning in our own individual

13. PDP, supra note 12, at 251.
14. M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 61 (Michael Holquist ed. & Caryl
Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981) [hereinafter DII.
15. V.N. VOLOSHINOV, MARXISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 102 (Ladislav
Matjejka & I.R. Titunick trans., 1973).
16. Id.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

consciousness.17 In this sense, dialogue is not merely a way to
understanding, but is understanding. t8
Given that understanding is dialogic, the elaboration of
meaning is an extraordinarily complex process. Any utterance
comes from "another's voice and filled with that other voice," and
"enters [the hearer's] context from another context, permeated with
the interpretations of others."19 Stated another way, meaning
"must find itself, reveal itself among other words, within an intense
field of interorientations."2
Bakhtin links up this conception of the elaboration of meaning
with the "immense plurality of experience." Individual experience,
based upon, among many other things, "parent, clan, class, religion,
country,"21 is in flux over time and is unique at any given time.22
While communication of course entails a measure of mutual

17. PDP, supra note 12, at 18, 261. Bakhtin cites an example from the work of
Dostoyevsky that illustrates the dialogic nature of individual consciousness. The text is from
POOR FOLK, Dostoyevsky's first novel, and represents the internal thoughts of the narrator
Makar Devushkin:
A day or two ago, in private conversation, Yevstafy Ivanovich said that the most
important virtue in a citizen was to earn money. He said in jest (Iknow it was in
jest) that morality consists in not being a burden to anyone. Well, I'm not a
burden to anyone. My crust of bread is my own; it is true it is a plain crust of
bread, at times a dry one; but there it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and
irreproachable use. Why, what can one do? I know very well, of course, that I
don't do much by copying; but all the same I am proud of working and earning
my bread in the sweat of my brow.
Id. at 207. Bakhtin points out that this single voice contains "an overlapping and merging"
dialogue and illustrates his point by transforming this "monologue" into a more conventional
"dialogue":
THE OTHER: One must know how to earn a lot of money. One shouldn't be a
burden to anyone. But you are a burden to others.
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: I'm not a burden to anyone. I've got my own piece of
bread.
THE OTHER: But what a piece of bread it is! Today it's there, and tomorrow
it's gone. And it's probably a dry one, at that!
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: It is true it is a plain crust of bread, at times a dry one,
but there it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and irreproachable use.
THE OTHER: But what kind of toil! All you do is copy. You're not especially
capable of anything else.
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: Well, what can one do! I know very well, of course,
that I don't do much by copying, but all the same I am proud of it.
Id. at 210.
18. Id. at 40, 252.
19. Id. at 202.
20. Id. at 239.
21. Wayne C. Booth, Introduction to MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, in PDP, supra note 12, at xxi.
22. DI, supra note 14, at 271.
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understanding, the plurality of experience insures that contradictions and complexities shoot through language:
[Alt any given moment of its historical existence, language is
heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence
of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the
past, between differing epochs of the past, between different
socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies,
schools, circles, and so forth.'
In other words, ideas from diverse sources interact both within
individuals and among individuals, and it is this dialogue that
elaborates meaning.2 4
Three important and related implications flow from this
conceptualization of meaning. First, meaning is not unitary.
Rather, it depends upon a unique set of conditions (i.e., the
"context") which exists at the actual time of utterance. Context
includes both a temporal dimension (i.e. the historical point in time
of the utterance) as well as a synchronic dimension (for example,
an individual's "parents, clan, class" at a given point in time). This
complex array of sociological, ideological and historical factors
determines the parameters of dialogue and thus informs meaning. 25
Second, ideas are never "closed-off" or "finalized," but
transform and renew themselves through a constant interaction
with other ideas. 26 Finally, meaning cannot be "abstract" or

23. Id. at 291. Bakhtin characterizes these processes as embodying a tension between
centrifugal and centripetal forces. Centrifugal forces, originating in political and cultural
influences, centralize and unify meaning. Id. at 271-72. Centripetal forces, originating in the
"immense plurality of experience", decentralize meaning. Id. Meaning is thus dynamic:
Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their
uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the
uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward.
Id. at 272.
24. Stanley Fish's notion of "interpretive communities" captures something of the
essence of this idea in a different way. Fish believes that "each of us is a member of not one
but innumerable interpretive communities in relation to which different kinds of belief are
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
operating with different weight and force."
NATURALLY 30 (1989). Fish describes this idea in relation to himself: "I am, among other
things, white, male, a teacher, a literary critic, a student of interpretation, a member of a law
faculty, a father, a son, an uncle, a husband (twice), a citizen, a (passionate) consumer, a
member of the middle class, a Jew, the oldest of four children, a cousin, a brother, a brotherin-law, a son-in-law, a Democrat, short, balding, fifty, an easterner who has been a westerner
and is now a southerner, a voter, a neighbor, an optimist, a department chairman." Id.
25. DI, supra note 14, at 271-72, 291.
26. Id. at 276. See also NIKOLAEAVICH & VOLOSHINOV, supra note 11, at 85-87.
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"neutral" because all words are "shot through" with "context" and
"intention. "27
Thus, in Bakhtin's view, language cannot present immutable
truths or finalized ideas. What we call "conclusions" are at best
provisional and contingent hypotheses embodied in language.
B. Monologic and Polyphonic Discourse
In addition to describing the elaboration of meaning, Bakhtin's
ideas have an intense normative dimension as well. In exploring
this normative dimension, Bakhtin introduced two terms: the
prevailing mode of approaching meaning is "monologic," while his
normative ideal is "polyphonic., 28 These
terms describe both
29
expressing.
of
ways
and
thinking
of
ways
A monologic view rejects the open-ended dialogic nature of
meaning in favor of a unitary and finalized sense of the world.
This sense of the world tends to be framed in terms of "the spirit
of a nation, the spirit of a people, [or] the spirit of history."3
Thus, monologism reduces multiple perspectives "to a single
ideological common denominator."31 For example, in a monologic
novel, while characters might speak to each other or have distinct
characterizations, they only interact "in the unified field of vision
of author, director and audience, against the clearly defined
background of a single-tiered world."32 There is no "plurality of
consciousness" and each character is "predetermined, closed-off,
finalized."33
Bakhtin vividly describes the consequences of this regime:
All that has the power to mean, all that has value, is everywhere concentrated around one center-the carrier. All
ideological creative acts are conceived and perceived as possible

27. DI, supra note 14, at 293. This idea highlights the difference between Bakhtin's
thought and JUrgen Habermas' notion of "discourse ethics." While Habermas grounds
discourse ethics on "intersubjective discourse," he ultimately seeks to create non-contextual,
universal principles of morality. See Jurgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does
Hegel's Critiqueof Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38 (1989). Although

Habermas expressly disclaims that his approach is monologic, in Bakhtinian terms, it is
profoundly so, as would any attempt to ground meaning independent of context.
28. PDP, supra note 12, at 80-82.
29. Id. at 88.
30. Id. at 82.
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id.
33. PDP, supra note 12, at 17-18.
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expressions of a single consciousness, a single spirit....
Everything capable of meaning can be gathered together in one
consciousness and subordinated to a unified accent; whatever
does not submit to such a reduction is accidental and unessential. . . . Semantic unity of any sort is everywhere represented
by a single consciousness and a single point of view.34

In contrast to the monologic mode, the ideal of "polyphony"
performs "a small-scale Copernican revolution" by rejecting an
abstract and fixed external position. 5 Instead, polyphony embraces "[a] plurality of independent and unmerged voices and
consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices."36 For
example, in a polyphonic novel, voices stand "alongside" that of the
author and are not submerged within it. 7 In addition, "there are
no detached, impersonal verities," no "thoughts ...which, when
removed from their context and detached from their voice, would
retain their semantic meaning in an impersonal form."3 8
Moreover, polyphony entails an active embrace of dialogue
and experience. "[T]o think" for a polyphonic author "means to
question and to listen, to try out new orientations, to combine some
and expose others."39 This mode embodies a "distrust of convictions,"' a seeking out not only of "the loud, recognized, reigning
voices of the epoch," but also "ideas not yet fully emerged, latent
ideas heard as yet by no one but himself, and ideas ... just

beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews."4 1 Thus, the

34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id. at 49.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. PDP, supra note 12, at 95-96. Bakhtin cites many examples of polyphonic writing
from Dostoyevsky. To take a brief example, in THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Ivan
experiences an internal dialogue regarding his father's murder. Id. at 258-59. One of Ivan's
internal voices does not want his father murdered. Ivan's second internal voice, however,
does want his father murdered, but only if it occurs against Ivan's will because then Ivan
would not feel remorse. This second voice-hidden for the most part from Ivan himself-is
in essence a rejoinder to the first voice. Another character, Smerdyakov, only hears Ivan's
second voice. However, in Ivan's external dialogues with Smerdyakov, Ivan answers with
his first voice, which Smerdyakov takes to mean the opposite of what this voice seems to be
saying. But Ivan's "voice that answers Smerdyakov is interrupted here and there by the
hidden rejoinder of [Ivan's] second voice." The rich and complex texture of these internal
and external dialogues exemplify the dialogic interactions that are, to Bakhtin, the hallmark
of a polyphonic novel.
39. Id. at 95. See also id. at 88.
40. Id. at 98.
41. Id. at 90.
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polyphonic author replaces "the relationship of a single cognizant
and judging 'I' to the world" with the "interrelationship of all these
cognizant and judging 'I's' to one another."42 Put another way,
the
participatory orientation [of polyphony] takes another person's
discourse seriously, and is capable of approaching it both as a
semantic position and as another point of view. Only through
such an inner dialogic orientation can my discourse find itself
in intimate contact with someone else's discourse, and yet at the
same time not fuse with it, not swallow it up, not dissolve in
itself the other's power to mean; that is, only thus can it retain

fully its independence as a discourse.43
Polyphony thus rejects the misleading veneer of certainty
embodied by the monologic tendency. The monologic mode does
not merely constrict meaning into one perspective, but assumes that
one perspective, that of the "carrier's", is the only right perspective.
In contrast, by embracing polyphony and intensifying dialogue,
discourse can become a rich medium "fraught with possibilities,"'
a stance with a mission to "reveal ever newer ways to mean.""
III. The Polyphonic Model of Judicial Discourse
According to Bakhtin, all understanding is dialogic. The
monologic mode rejects this idea and operates under the fiction
that there is a single, all-encompassing perspective. The polyphonic
mode embraces the dialogic nature of meaning and seeks to
intensify the elaboration of meaning "through intimate contact with
another person's discourse." These ideas are a powerful means to
analyze the current state of judicial discourse.
A.

The Judicial Opinion As Dialogue

As the central tool through which judges elaborate meaning,
opinions are dialogic. Opinions engage in a dialogue which
includes practitioners, litigants, scholars, law students, other
governmental actors, the general public and, perhaps most
conspicuously, other judges. For example, judges interpret other
opinions, examine their stories and modes of analysis, while citing,
42. Id. at 100.
43. PDP, supra note 12, at 64.

44. Id. at 91.
45. DI, supra note 14, at 346 (emphasis deleted). See also id. at 366-71.
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limiting, overruling and otherwise commenting on what other
judges have written.46 Opinions thus become part of a complex
web of writers and readers who elaborate legal meaning. How a
given judge characterizes "the law" is the result of this dialogue.
Moreover, opinions embody a dialogue among parties. The
adversary system presents judges with at least two perspectives
which offer conflicting accounts of facts and law. Parties respond
to adversaries and judges, and judges respond to adversaries. In
this sense, litigation is dialogic. The parties and the judge or judges
engage in a dialogue, with the judge assigned the role of bringing
the dialogue to some sort of resolution which, under certain
circumstances, is articulated in an opinion.
In addition, while a voluntary settlement or judicially enforced
resolution terminates litigation, the judicial dialogue is never
finalized. Doctrine evolves over time. Conceptions of, for
example, the First Amendment, due process, the Equal Protection
Clause and the evolving interpretations of statutes are all reconfigured and renewed under the power of historical change and shifting
context-the essence of Bakhtin's "intense field of
interorientations. '

Thus, although definitive in form, opinions

are exploratory in function.
Finally, the judicial dialogue is, at least in theory, a heavily
contextualized process. The classic conception of the jurisdictional
requirement of an actual "case" and "controversy," and the related
doctrines of standing, ripeness and mootness derived from it, insure
that litigation presents a judge with a unique factual matrix.48

46. See James Boyd White, What's An Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367

(1995) (a judicial opinion "connects cases across time and space" and "thus engages in the
central conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion itself makes
possible"). See also K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 49 (1930).
[N]o case can have a meaning by itself! Standing alone, it can give you no
guidance ... . What counts, what gives you leads, what gives you sureness, that is
the background of the other cases in relation to which you must read the one.
They color the language, the technical terms, used in the opinion. But above all
they give you the wherewithal to find which of the facts are significant, and in
what aspect they are significant, and how far the rules laid down are to be trusted.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
48. For a general discussion of the operation of these doctrines as a limitation on federal

jurisdiction, see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case"
or "Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-69 (2d ed. 1988).
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This coheres with the primacy of context in the dialogic elaboration
of meaning.
B. Polyphony As A Normative Goal For Judges
Not only are opinions descriptively dialogic, but opinions, and
the approach of judges who write them, should as a normative
matter be more polyphonic. This is because polyphony addresses
aspects of critiques of judicial decision-making and promotes the
role opinions play in the legal system.
1. Polyphony and Critiques of Judicial Decision-Making.-Polyphony taps into recurring themes in both longstanding
and current critiques of judicial decision-making.
First, many commentators have called for a greater understanding by judges of the importance of their own perspectives and
assumptions.49 Jerome Frank, in an oft-quoted passage, articulated this concern while a Second Circuit judge: "Much harm is done
by the myth that, by merely putting on a black robe and by taking
the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips
himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking
machine."" ° In this sense, Bakhtin's rejection of an abstracted,
monologic perspective offers a means for judges to move beyond
the fanciful (and impossible) image of "a passionless thinking
machine."" t Polyphony is the antithesis of a false sense of a
perspectiveless truth, and thus it promotes a greater sense of critical
self-consciousness.
Second, Bakhtin's ideas resonate with the contemporary
emphasis in feminist, critical race and postmodern theory on

49. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 3, at 216 (calling for "more concern for the projected
assumptions in decision-making, and a deeper awareness of both the hidden perspectives and
projected certitudes in the judicial voice"); Feldman, supra note 2, at 2278 ("critical theory
must facilitate our penetration and understanding of... sedimented layers of tradition, thus
raising to the surface of consciousness at least some of our tacit prejudices and interests").
50. In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943). The "legal realists" offered a
particularly scathing and influential critique of a mechanistic view of the law. See, e.g.,
LLEWELLYN, supra note 46; Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L.R. 645 (1932).
51. Although few scholars, judges, or practitioners would take seriously the ideal of "a

passionless thinking machine," the equivalent of this image continues to be evoked without
irony by the Supreme Court. For example, Justice Kennedy recently noted that judges have
"the acquired skill and capacity to disregard extraneous matters" through the exercise of
"wisdom and good sense." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 562, 565 (1994) (Kennedy,

J., concurring).

1996]

THE POLYPHONIC COURTROOM

distinct "voices" and perspectives of others. 2 Under this view, the
judicial perspective is bounded by, among other things, class, race
and gender. Given this limited perspective, judges tend to devalue
unfamiliar perspectives. These unfamiliar perspectives, in turn,
tend to belong to those groups who have been, and continue to be,

underrepresented in the judiciary. Indeed, some commentators
have noted that cases such as Dred Scott P. Sandford,53 Plessy v.
Ferguson,54 Buck v. Bel 5 and Korematsu v. United States56 all

reduced the voice of oppressed groups into meaningless abstraction.57 Polyphony addresses this concern by valorizing the
intensification of dialogue with as many ideas and individuals as
possible.58
Third, Bakhtin's vision vividly parallels Professor Robert
Cover's characterization of law as either "jurispathic" or "jurisgenerative.'' The "jurispathic" function of the law ends dialogue and
destroys other normative visions,' precisely the impact of a

52. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMrr 62 (1992) (an
"ethical relation" is "a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally,
that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her
difference and singularity"); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) ("those who have experienced
discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen"). Carol Gilligan has, of
course, been a particularly influential advocate of the notion of a distinct "voice" based on
gender. CAROL A. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
Interestingly, judges themselves have expressly asked for guidance on how the act of
judging can accommodate the multiplicity of human voices. See Patricia Wald, Human Voice
in Legal Discourse: Disembodied Voices-An Appellate Judge's Response, 66 TEX. L. REV.
623, 628 (1988).
53. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

55. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

This case sustained a state law providing for coerced

sterilization of persons deemed mentally unfit. The opinion contains Holmes' infamous
observation that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
56. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a detailed analysis of two of the opinions in Korematsu,
see infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
57. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narrative: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991). See also infra notes 97-99, 187-92 and
accompanying text.
58. Feldman, supra note 2, at 2278 ("hearing the diverse voices of others encourages us
to recognize the contingency of our own prejudices and interests, while on the other hand,
we more easily appreciate the value of our own uniqueness in the community").
59. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983). For a more recent consideration of Cover's ideas,
see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 1441 (1990).
60. Cover, supra note 59, at 40-44.
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monologic worldview. The notion of polyphony captures the
essence of Cover's call for
a "jurisgenerative" view that embraces
61
worlds.
normative
other
Fourth, Bakhtin offers a sophisticated notion of how experience influences meaning. While critiques of legal reasoning have
long accepted life "experience" as an essential element of judicial
decision-making,62 polyphony transforms vague invocations of the
importance of "experience ,63 into a set of concepts that leads to
a vision of what judges can do to enrich their sense of meaning.
Finally, Bakhtin offers a constructive, practical response to the
challenge posed by postmodernism.' It has often been noted that
post-modernism deconstructs so thoroughly that it leaves only
nihilism in its wake.65 Polyphony draws upon the dialogic process,
non-finalizable and intensified with as many voices as possible, as
a vehicle to enrich possibilities in meaning.
2. Polyphony and the Need for Explanation, Guidance and
Predictability.-Opinions,of course, function in the practical world
of litigation. Three primary functions of opinions--explanation,
guidance and prediction-would all be well served by polyphony.
First, opinions are preeminently explanatory tools that explain
to the community of interested readers why a given resolution is
fair and based on law. 66 Polyphony would enrich this explanatory

61. Id. at 68.
62. See Smith, supra note 2, at 430-31.
[O]ne must wonder.., whether anyone could devise a theory that is not grounded
in experience. Try it for yourself: invent a theory that does not arise from or
relate to anything in your experience. What would such a theory even address?
Distributive justice in the Martian economy? Sexual relations in the sixth
dimension?
Id.

63. This idea is perhaps best evoked by recalling the seemingly endless repetitions of
Holmes' famous aphorism that "the life of the law is not logic, but experience." HOLMES,
supra note 9, at 1.
64. Although variously described, postmodemism generally "seeks to rethink problems
from a perspective that is nonuniversalist or 'local' in character, holistic, and discursive."
Patterson, supra note 2, at 269. The work of Steven Winter offers a particularly compelling
view of postmodernism and the law. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 59; Steven Winter,
Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893 (1993).
65. A valuable summary and exploration of this dilemma is Feldman, supra note 2. See
also Daniel Barbiero, Agreeing To Disagree:Interpretationafter the End of Consensus, 78
GEO. L.J. 447 (1989).
66. See White, supra note 46, at 1366-67. See also In Justice Breyer's Opinion, A
Footnote Has No Place, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1995, at B18 (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer
as saying that "the major function of an opinion is to explain to the audience of readers why
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function. It would resolve a given case with as great an understanding as possible of the complexity of perspectives and the
consequences of potential outcomes. Polyphony would also
that a given decision is
elaborate doctrine with the understanding
67
contingent on facts and history.
In addition, explanation informed by polyphony might increase
the legitimacy of the decision-making process both among litigants
and among society at large. By embracing complexity and
dialogue, both litigants and others might be less inclined to view
opinions as embodying "winners" and "losers," or a "right" position
and a "wrong" position.
The open texture of the polyphonic model might also enhance
the second and third functions of opinions-guidance for judges in
resolving controversies and prediction for attorneys in anticipating
the likely outcome of litigation. 6' By revealing more of the
competing concerns and modes of analysis entailed by decisionmaking, readers of a polyphonic opinion might be better able to
glean what led a court to a given decision. This is in striking
contrast to the current mode of opinion-writing which conceals
complexity behind a smooth monologic surface.
In any event, the underlying assumption that opinions furnish
rigid constraints as precedent is problematic. As Karl Llewellyn
noted, "[t]here is no precedent that the judge may not at his need
either file down to razor thinness or expand into a bludgeon."'69
Thus it is unlikely that a more polyphonic approach would be less
constraining on future decision-makers given the minimal con-

it is that the Court has reached that decision").
67. It should also be noted that while any explanation finalizes conclusions as to a given
case, finality does not necessarily mean that dialogue is finalized. Indeed, the elaboration

of doctrine through precedent comprised of concrete "cases and controversies" presupposes
that dialogue will continue. See PDP, supra note 12, at 95 (in a polyphonic "world even
agreement retains its dialogic character, that is, it never leads to a merging of voices and
truths in a single impersonal truth, as occurs in the monologic world") (emphasis in original);
Feldman, supra note 2, at 2273 ("[i]f we are concerned with promoting political dialogue,
then consensus should be viewed as but one moment in dialogue, not its end"); JEANFRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 65-66

(1984) ("consensus is only a particular state of discussion"); RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism,
Relativism, and Irrationalism,in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 172 (1982) (conceiving

of agreement as the goal of conversation "mistakes an essential moment in the course of an
activity for the end of the activity").
68. These two functions are considered together because an attorney predicts the
outcome of litigation by assuming the role of a judge who is guided by precedent.
69. LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 180.
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straints that currently bind existing decision-makers. Indeed,
polyphonic opinions might prove to be even more constraining
since their greater openness could make them less susceptible to
either filing down or bludgeoning.

C. The Judicial Opinion as Monologic Utterance
Despite the virtues of a polyphonic model of judicial discourse,
the typical judicial opinion does not fare well when examined in
light of the normative goal of polyphony. Indeed, as currently
conceived, a judicial opinion typically acts like a monologic crucible
combining multiple perspectives into a "unified accent" in order to
reach a final result.7" This unified accent subordinates not only
the perspectives of the litigants, but the perspectives of other
judges. Judicial opinions therefore do not invite debate but end it
with authoritative finality.
The concurring opinion by Justice Scalia in the recent Supreme
Court affirmative action decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,7 offers a virtually pure example of the genre. The majority
in Adarand held that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion is as follows:72
In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest'
in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. Individuals
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be
no such thing as a creditor or debtor race. That concept is alien
to the Constitution's focus upon the individual, and its rejection
of dispositions based on race or based on blood. To pursue the
concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and
benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American.73
The monologic qualities of Justice Scalia's opinion are legion:
70. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 204-08; Hersch, supra note 11, at 48.
71. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
72. I have omitted citations and a brief opening and concluding sentence that are not
pertinent here.
73. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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1. It is decontextualized.-Justice Scalia is setting forth an
abstract view of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable under all
circumstances. In doing so, he invokes a single set of governmental
"eyes" and a single constitutional "focus," metaphors that recall the
unitary "spirit of a nation" and "spirit of a people" that Bakhtin
cited as paradigms of an abstract, and therefore monologic,
worldview.74 However, there is neither one set of "eyes" that
views all citizens as of one race nor a single constitutional "focus"
on the individual.75 In fact, the concept of "affirmative action"
interacts with "equal protection of the laws" through a complex
and inconsistent contemporary understanding contingent on source
and perspective.76 In light of this, Justice Scalia's ultimate conclusions are not necessarily wrong, but his profound reductionism
cannot be right.
2. There is no recognition of the validity of alternative
ideas.-Whatever one's personal opinion about affirmative action,
as an issue, it is complex and vexing.77 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion ignores even the possibility that an
exploration of the issue extends beyond how affirmative action is
"alien" to the Constitution. In other words, there is one voice, the
monologic voice, 78and it swallows up other perspectives into its own
unified "accent.
3. The right decision is a matter of compulsion, not
discretion.-Justice Scalia is not choosing among reasonable
alternatives. Any recognition that things could go either way is
anathema. To Justice Scalia, there is one interpretation of

74. PDP, supra note 12, at 82.

75. As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissenting opinion in Adarand, "for most of
our Nation's history, the idea that 'we are just one race' was not embraced." 115 S.Ct. at
2134 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting). See also Horwitz, supra note 8, at 68.
76. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
77. Indeed, the sheer number of opinions filed in Adarand-JusticesO'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg all filed separate opinions-demonstrates how
difficult affirmative action cases are to resolve.

78. This is not to say that all monologic opinions wholly ignore points made in other
opinions in any given case. However, in a monologic opinion, "[d]ifferences from the
speaking voice in the judicial opinion are raised only to be answered by it." Ferguson, supra

note 3, at 205. For an analysis of how this strategy operates in a monologic opinion, see
infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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precedent and history, 79the right one, and this interpretation
compels only one result.
4. It is authoritarian.-Despitethe prevailing conception of
judge as neutral and detached decision-maker, ° this concurring
opinion is written from the perspective of an advocate. Justice
Scalia's client is a bounded set of ideas about affirmative action.
He has written about these ideas before,81 and he is engaged again
in writing what is tantamount to a polemic about them. His
confidence in the accuracy of his own views is palpable.
5. It invokes a unitary past.-JusticeScalia's opinion invokes
a unitary past, what Bakhtin called a single "spirit of history."'
There is no sense "that the complexity of the past can justify a
variety of conclusions."83
Indeed, events surrounding the adoption of the Equal
Protection Clause are themselves a stark demonstration of the
misleading historical reductionism of Justice Scalia's opinion. The
history of the Clause is a muddled confusion that supports any
number of conclusions.8" One's view of the Clause's ambiguous
history is contingent on a range of variables that contribute to a
selective reading of the historical record." These factors might be
mutually inconsistent or they might reinforce each other. They
might be shared or not shared with others. Any asserted "spirit of
history" is thus a unique formulation by one individual in one
context at one point in time.

79. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 207 (a judicial opinion "must... appear as if forced
to its inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the duties of office, which
together eliminate all thought of an unfettered hand").

80. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
82. PDP, supra note 12, at 82.
83. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 214.

84. For example, one historian has noted that "[v]oluminous evidence has been
presented in support of both the expansive and narrow readings of the Fourteenth

Amendment" and concludes that "[c]onfusion and contradiction abound" in the ambiguous
historical record about the Amendment.

WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE To JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 4 (1988).

85. Indeed, it is well established that individuals construe evidence to validate
preexisting beliefs. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, Justice Scalia conjures up an immutable past
which trumps a messy contested present.86 This invocation seeks
to place the contested present beyond dialogue and thus is starkly
monologic 7
6. It is finalized.-Justice Scalia does not recognize that
discourse should continue on the issue of affirmative action.
Rather he equates the holding of a case with finalization of
dialogue. 88
While Justice Scalia's opinion represents monologic opinionwriting in virtually pure form, its pervasive monologic qualities
accurately represent the prevailing norm.89 Opinions tend to be
polemics in support of an idea or cluster of ideas. Few opinions
embrace a true interplay of ideas or recognize that diverse and
sometimes inconsistent conceptions have independent validity.
D. Elements of a Polyphonic Opinion
Although the monologic opinion typifies the current state of
judicial discourse, some judges have written opinions which do
embody elements of polyphony. Dissenting opinions from
Korematsu v. United States' and Callins v. Collins" illustrate
such a polyphonic approach.
1. Korematsu v. United States.-Korematsu v. United States,
the majority opinion of which is now almost universally condemned,92 presented the issue of whether the forced exclusion of

86. DI, supra note 14, at 342-44. See also ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE
REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE, 3-23 (1953). This aspect of
Justice Scalia's monologic opinion recalls the use of history in epic literature, in which the
world "was projected ... into a valorized past of beginnings and peak times" which are
"distanced, finished and closed like a circle." DI, supra note 14, at 19.
87. Invocations of "original intent" are another example of this type of monologic
analysis. The concept of original intent presupposes that: (1) different framers all thought
the same thing; (2) each individual framer had a single articulable "intent"; and (3) each
intent-to the extent there was a unitary intent-remained constant over time. See generally
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Ralcore
ed., 1990).
88. See supra text accompanying note 26. See also supra note 67.
89. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 204-08; Hersch, supra note 11, at 48.
90. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
91. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 4, at 1379. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing Korematsu as "yield[ing] a pass for an odious,
gravely injurious racial classification").
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Japanese-Americans from certain geographic areas during World
War II violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.9 The exclusion order
had the effect of forcing affected
94
homes.
their
from
persons
Elements of the familiar monologism of Justice Scalia's
Adarand concurrence9 5 are evident in Justice Black's majority
opinion in Korematsu. Justice Black adopts almost exclusively the
voice of "the properly constituted military authorities [who] feared
an invasion of our West Coast."9 6 These "authorities ... felt
constrained to take proper security measures." 97 The studied
blandness of this monologic voice swallows up any hint of the pain
felt by victims of the exclusion orders.
Moreover, the monologic voice which pervades Korematsu
preserves its unitary character by dismissing discordant perspectives
as irrelevant or misleading. For example, any investigation of the
circumstances present at the "relocation centers" is unnecessary:
"[r]egardless of the true nature of the of the assembly and
relocation centers ... we are dealing specifically with nothing but
an exclusion order. 98 Any attempt to question the motives of the
military authorities is an inappropriate use "of the calm perspective
of hindsight."9 9 In perhaps the most striking of all these monologic rejections, Justice Black wrote that "[t]o cast this case into
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of
hostility to him or his race."'" The monologic voice, as the sole
carrier of meaning in the opinion, cannot admit the validity of a
discordant voice. Needless to say, this "confusing" voice happened
to be that of the victims.
In fascinating contrast, Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent
approaches a polyphonic ideal. 1 ' As opposed to a monologue of
military necessity, the dissent manifests a remarkable sensitivity to
different perspectives.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221.
Id. at 220.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-89.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 233 (Murphy, J.,dissenting).
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Like the majority, Justice Murphy hears the voice of the
military. This dissent recognizes that there was "a very real fear of
invasion of the Pacific Coast, accompanied by fears of sabotage and
espionage in that area." 1" He admits that the military's actions
might have been "well-intentioned" 103 and were related to "matters ... vital to the physical security of the nation." 1" He even
admits "that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent
on the Pacific Coast who did all in their power to aid their
ancestral land." 10 5
However, unlike the majority, Justice Murphy does not view
the perspective of the military authorities as a unitary voice of
concern speaking to the nation's security. To the contrary, he
hears voices that "fall[] into the ugly abyss of racism. ' 1°6 For
example, Justice Murphy quotes a report by the Commanding
General which characterizes Japanese-Americans "as belonging to
'an enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted." ''' ° Justice
Murphy also cites the testimony of the military Commanding
General before a congressional subcommittee:
"I don't want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here.
They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine
their loyalty ... It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. . . . [W]e must worry
about,,108the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the

map.

In addition, Justice Murphy incorporates the perspectives of
others who supported the relocation. For example, he quotes the
president of a trade association that would have benefitted
economically as a result of the internment: "'We're charged with
wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons .... We do. It's
a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or
the brown men."' 1°9
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Murphy
individualizes the victims, many of whom were children and the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 240.
Korematsu, 323 US. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 236 n.2.
Id. at 239 n.12 (alteration in original).
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elderly n ° He recognizes that the supposedly menacing concentration of Japanese-Americans near "strategic points" was the
result of "economic, social and soil conditions" including "[1]imited
occupational outlets and social pressures . ..."'11 He cites social
science literature to conclude that fears about espionage were
based on "misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for
years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people
with racial and economic prejudices ....
Justice Murphy's opinion thus embodies a dialogue among
voices. While, to be sure, he vigorously supports his position, there
is a rich, multi-vocal quality to his narrative which is lacking in the
majority opinion." 3 Such a multiplicity of perspectives approaches the polyphonic ideal.
2. Callins v. Collins.-Another illuminating contrast can be
seen between the two opinions, one by Justice Scalia and one by
Justice Blackmun, relating to the denial of certiorari in the capital
case of Callins v. Collins. This case gained attention because
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, concluded for the first time that
the administration of capital punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'14
The familiar monologism of Justice Scalia is once again
apparent in his Callins' concurrence. Calling Justice Blackmun to
task for his dissent, Scalia's concurrence invokes two voices that are
consistent. One is the disembodied "text and tradition" of the
Constitution which establishes "beyond doubt" that capital
1 ' The other is the voice belonging
punishment is constitutional."
to the victims of capital crimes.116 All other perspectives are
"false.""1 7 There is thus no hint of complexity or tension in the

110. Id. at 242.
111. Id. at 238 n.9.
112. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239.

113. Korematsu also illustrates that polyphony is not synonymous with "liberal."
Polyphony is "liberal" only insofar as, at this moment in time, dominant monologic
perspectives tend to be associated with "conservative" judicial philosophies, but this is not
inevitably so. Korematsu itself is a good illustration: Justice Douglas, who is generally
considered to be one of the most "liberal" Supreme Court justices of the twentieth century,
joined the majority opinion written by Justice Black, a fellow "liberal."
114. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S.Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1127.
116. Id. at 1128.
117. Id.
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opinion. Indeed, like his Adarand concurrence and Justice Black's
majority opinion in Korematsu, this opinion's simplicity is its most
salient characteristic.
Justice Blackmun's dissent is strikingly different." 8 First, like
Justice Murphy's Korematsu opinion, this dissent embodies a
variety of voices, some of which are in tension with each other.
Justice Blackmun alludes to society's legitimate "demand for
punishment""' as well as public opinion in favor of the death
penalty."2 The dissent also recognizes, however, that these voices
overwhelm those in society who "speak in too faint a voice to be
heard ... .""1 Indeed, Justice Blackmun saves capital defendants
from hazy abstraction by recalling the "staggering evidence of racial
prejudice" in sentencing," the images of an actual scene of
execution" 3 and the identity of the capital defendants (including
those who have colorable claims to innocence,'24 the mentally
retarded 1" and juveniles). 26
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun openly acknowledges "struggl[ing]" with the issue over time.'27 This openness translates into a
recognition that this opinion is contingent on time and experience-two themes that constantly recur in the opinion."2 Indeed,
he admits that "[p]erhaps one day this Court will develop" a
constitutionally permissible capital sentencing scheme129-a
recognition of potential fallibility that is unthinkable in both Justice
Scalia's concurrence and monologic opinions generally.

118. Id. at 1128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1136.
120. Id. at 1131.
121. Id. at 1136 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). This phrasing recalls Bakhtin's call to listen to perspectives beyond "the loud,
recognized, reigning voices of the epoch." See supra text accompanying note 41.
122. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1135.
123. Id. at 1128.
124. Id. at 1138 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993)).
125. Id. at 1137 n.6 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
126. Id. at 1137 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). This concretization
extends beyond the identity of defendants to a vivid description of the responsibilities borne
by all actors involved in the adjudication of capital cases, including judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys. Id. at 1128-29.
127. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130.
128. See id. at 1129-30, 1132, 1134. In the space of two pages, the opinion mentions four
times how "[t]wenty years have passed since" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The
word "experience" recurs three times in the opinion. See Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129, 1132,
1134.
129. Id., at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Finally, and perhaps most distinctively, Justice Blackmun
makes no effort to hide from complexity. This is manifested not
only in how he recounts his own, as well as the Court's, struggle to
elaborate meaningful and fair guidelines for capital punishment, but
also in his recognition of the turbulence and complexity of the
decision-making process itself. As he puts it, "experience has
taught" that capital sentencing decisions are "rife with all of life's
,30
understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions ....
This phrase not only describes the behavior of "the sentencer" at
a capital trial, but also the complexity that Justice Blackmun
acknowledges in his own decision-making.
Justice Blackmun has thus performed his own "small-scale
Copernican revolution" by abdicating "an abstract and fixed
external position., 131 Instead, he infuses his decision-making with
understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions-a polyphony
of ideas and perspectives.
IV. The Cognitive Challenge of Polyphony
The opinions of Justices Murphy and Blackmun demonstrate
that a polyphonic approach to judicial decision-making is attainable.
However, the mere acceptance of polyphony as a worthwhile goal
does not end the inquiry. To the contrary, profound challenges
face any attempt to move beyond the monologic tendency because
the act of cognition is itself a simplifying process. This does not
mean, of course, that judges, or anyone else, are "biologically
determined" to be monologic. However, it does mean that there
is a wide array of cognitive processes which, often without our
conscious knowledge, serve to reduce and stabilize meaning and
inspire confidence that we are "right" and others are "wrong."
While these are obviously sobering conclusions, these processes
also offer insights into how to approach polyphony. First, an
understanding of how cognition simplifies meaning might diminish
the certainty with which we hold to our own beliefs. This represents a necessary first step towards polyphony. Second, as
discussed in Part V,132
' these processes themselves suggest possible
strategies that judges can employ to become more polyphonic.

130. Id. at 1134-35.
131. See PDP, supra note 12, at 49. See also, supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
132. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.

1996]
A.

THE POLYPHONIC COURTROOM

Cognitive Conservatism

Without an ability to build upon preexisting interpretations of
events, humans would expend vast amounts of mental energy
interpreting anew each circumstance confronted or life would, in
William James' phrase, be "'a bloomin' buzzin' confusion.' ' 133 In
order to avoid either of these fates, humans construct meaning
through "knowledge structures.' ' 134

These structures, which

include schemata, 35 scripts'36 and narratives, 137 provide short-

133. Quoted in THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113
(Otto Nevrath et al. eds., 2d vol. 1970).
134. In a famous statement, Jerome Bruner in 1957 noted that a perceiver interprets
meaning by "going beyond the information given." Jerome S. Bruner, Going Beyond the
Information Given, in CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO COGNITION 41 (Howard E. Gruber
et al. eds., 1957). This statement is often cited as the beginning of the "cognitive revolution."
See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human
Misunderstanding,in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319, 320-21
(Mark P. Zann ed., 1991). As later described by Bruner, the essence of the cognitive
revolution "was to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created
out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaningmaking processes were implicated." JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 2 (1990).
135. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 38 (1980).
136. Scripts are defined as background knowledge, the sort of "normal expectations"
about people and experience that we all carry around in our heads. JEAN M. MANDLER,
STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY 94, 108 (1984). The seminal
theoretical work positing the existence of scripts is ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P.
ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977).
137. Recent scholarship explores how narrative operates cognitively.
Although
traditionally thought of as "representing" reality, narrative may also be a means "not only
of representing but of constituting reality." Jerome S. Bruner, The Narrative Construction
of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 5 (1991). See also Katherine Nelson, ed., NARRATIVES
FROM THE CRIB (Katherine Nelson ed., 1989); JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL
UNDERSTANDING (1988).
There is now a vast literature exploring how narrative influences legal meaning. Some
commentators have explored narrative in relation to advocacy. See, e.g., Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9 (1994) (oral
arguments); Richard K. Sherwin, The NarrativeConstructionof Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV.
681 (1994) (briefs). Others have focused on how judges and juries employ narratives to
decide cases. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The ProverbialWoman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 7 (1993); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). Narrative has also furnished
a foundation for how law is defined. See Cover, supra note 59. at 4. There has also been
an explosion of the use of narrative as the form for legal scholarship, particularly among
scholars identified with the critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence movements. See
e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
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cuts and simplifications that avoid the necessity of analyzing every
aspect of every situation presented for interpretation. 38 These
presuppositions, or "heuristics", are comprised of cultural norms
and individual experience.'3 9
Such cognitive heuristics profoundly influence how we think.
For example, people tend to overestimate the normativity1 ° and
accuracy' of their own beliefs. Through what iscalled "confirmation bias," we "manage knowledge in a variety of ways to
promote the selective availability of information that confirms
'
judgments already arrived at."142
Through "biased fact assimilation," we interpret facts consistent with those we already believe. 43 Additionally, through "biased hypothesis testing" we
subject evidence supporting hypotheses with which we do not agree
to far greater scrutiny than evidence supporting hypotheses to
which we are sympathetic. 144

138. For general applications of these concepts to judicial decision-making, see John R.
Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 657, 691-94
(1994); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8-20 (1994).
139. NISBETr & Ross, supra note 135, at 34. See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS
TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982). The Nisbett & Ross and the Kahneman & Tversky resources are
influential surveys of these heuristics. For a useful summary of more recent research in this
area, see Griffin & Ross, supra note 134.
140. Id. at 337-38. One study showed "that in a survey of preferences and beliefs.., the
subjects who made a given choice estimated the commonness of that choice to be greater
than did subjects who made the opposite choice." Id. at 337.
141. See, e.g., Derek J. Koehler, Hypothesis Generationand Confidence in Judgment, 20
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 461 (1994); Asher Koriat
et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN LEARNING &
MEMORY 107 (1980).
142. Anthony G. Greenwald, The TotalitarianEgo: Fabricationand Revision of Personal
History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 606 (1980). Studies have also shown that "even when
the entire evidential base of newly formed theories is discredited the social theory is left
virtually intact." Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Counterexplanation
on the Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 24,
25 (1986) (citations omitted).
Some recent studies have refrained "confirmation bias" in terms of "positive test
strategy," through which people "overweight confirming results and underweight
disconfirming results." Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in
Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 512 (1991).
143. Griffin & Ross, supra note 134, at 348-50. See also Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarizatiorn The Effects of Prior Theories On Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) [hereinafter Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation].
144. Lord et al., Consideringthe Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1232 (1984) [hereinafter Lord et al., Considering
the Opposite]; Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis Testing Processes in Social
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The stereotype is another example of resource-preserving
heuristics 45 Stereotypes provide ready interpretations of the
behavior of others without the necessity of analyzing individuating
characteristics or circumstances.1 6 Stereotypes are also another
aspect of confirmation bias; we are likely to interpret evidence
about people to conform with an implicated stereotype. 47
These tendencies demonstrate, at a minimum, that humans are
cognitive conservatives. 8 Humans reach conclusions on a variety
of matters-legal, political and social-and adhere to them in order
to avoid repeatedly having to think about them anew.149 Once
we reach conclusions, our mind acts to reaffirm what we already
believe.150 This extends to the retention of existing beliefs even
after the invalidation of the original evidence that fostered these
beliefs. 51
B. The Interplay of Monologism and Cognitive Conservatism
There is a nexus between cognitive conservatism and the
monologic tendency in judicial opinions. The stubborn persistence
of beliefs reduces complexity into simple "truths," one of the
essences of monologic opinions. 52 Moreover, cognitive conservatism inhibits the consideration of alternative ideas through the
appearance that they are self-evidently "wrong." In other words,
cognition simplifies meaning and then instills confidence that one's
own simplification is "right."

Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1202 (1978).
145. For an excellent recent summary of research on stereotypes, see Charles Stangor &
James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups: Advances in Understanding
Stereotypes and Stereotyping,in 26 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357
(1994).
146. See Macrae et al., Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive
Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1994). In addition to preservation of
cognitive resources, some researchers have also found that people tend to stereotype their
own group positively and groups to which they are not a part negatively as a mechanism to
enhance self-esteem. Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at 357-58.
147. See Ronald A. Farrell & Malcolm D. Holmes, The Social and Cognitive Structure
of Legal Decision-Making, 32 SOC. Q. 529, 532-33 (1991).
148. Greenwald, supra note 142, at 606.
149. See id. See also Anderson & Sechler, supra note 142, at 32.
150. For an influential account of how this principle applies to scientific inquiry, see
KUHN, supra note 133.
151. Lord et al., supra note 144, at 1240; Koehler, supra note 142, at 501.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
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Moreover, there is a twist to the interplay of cognitive
tendencies and judicial opinion writing: opinions promote as well
as embody a monologic world view. The reason for this lies in the
impact of opinion writing itself. Through a well-established process
called "explanation bias," the very act of explaining a decision
convinces the explainer of its accuracy and "truth."'53 Thus, as
a result of writing an explanation, "a certain inertia sets in,1' 54
which
makes it more difficult to consider alternative hypotheses.'
This interplay between cognition and the monologic opinion
has important consequences for attaining polyphony. Due to
cognitive conservatism, people tend to be simplifiers and reducers
who are then confident of the truth of their simplifications and
reductions. The conventional monologic opinion further inhibits
discourse by intensifying an unshakable belief in the truth of the
written analysis and shutting down the consideration of alternative
hypotheses. This is likely to carry over to future opinions addressing similar issues. Indeed, as one judge has noted, "[t]he same
issues recur in cases over the years, and [judges] tend to think
about them in the same ways. '
Thus, it is not surprising that unexamined assumptions about
gender, 156 race1 57 and economic status'58 have all profoundly
influenced the development of legal doctrine. Similarly, it is hardly
surprising that judges are typically writers of monologic opinions.
C Polyphony in Light of Cognitive Conservatism
It is seductive to view cognitive conservatism as generating
"distortions" which, like myopic vision, can be easily corrected.
However, these processes are not distortions, but rather a "prerequisite to perception itself."' 59 In other words, at least to a certain
153. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 142.
154. Id. at 503. As Koehler explains, cognitive conservatism drives this heuristic as well:
"Because of the practical limits on our processing abilities and on our time, we cannot
continue indefinitely in an exhaustive search for all possible hypotheses." Id. at 512.
155. Wald, supra note 4, at 1385. Moreover, analyses of United Supreme Court opinions
demonstrate how consistently voting patterns conform to preexisting ideological values. See,
e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989).
156. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 137, at 7; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term:
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
157. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 76.
158. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,
79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
159. Kuhn, supra note 133, at 113.
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extent, we are simplifiers not by choice, but because we are built
that way.
Moreover, the unconscious nature of cognitive conservatism
intensifies the difficulty of strategies designed to achieve greater
polyphony." ° As humans, we assume that what we see is the
truth without any recognition that our "previous visual-conceptual
experience" actually defines what we see. 161 Indeed, evidence
suggests a built-in overconfidence factor through which we feel that
others interpret the1 62world subjectively, while our own interpretation
is the "right one.
This suggests that achieving polyphony requires more than an
act of will. Even a sincere attempt to reach out to other perspectives might fall victim to unconscious tendencies that simplify
meaning and reaffirm what we already believe. Indeed, studies
have demonstrated that exhortations to be "fair and impartial"
1 63
have little or no effect on the operation of cognitive heuristics
and, presumably, on the monologic tendency as well.
Thus, a judge would do well to avoid the classic ideal of "a
detached magistrate presiding over a dispute in which he or she has
neither personal interest nor predisposition." 1"
This model
presupposes that judges can simply "put aside ... predispositions". 65 Yet, this is an impossibility in light of Bakhtin's dialogic
model and current theories in social psychology.1"
Instead,
judges should seek out creative ways to reveal presuppositions as
presuppositions and thereby open up new possibilities of meaning.
160. Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at 357.
161. Kuhn, supra note 133, at 113.
162. Griffin & Ross, supra note 134, at 354.
163. Lord et al., supra note 144, at 1231. Indeed, conscious attempts to eliminate
stereotyping result in a "rebounding" effect through which the stereotype reemerges with
even greater force. C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight. Stereotypes on the
Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (1994).
164. Jack Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning,Speaking, andActing: Part! Speaking
and Part llActing, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 5, n.16 (1994).
165. Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 136 F.R.D. 652, 656-58 (C.D. Cal. 1991). See also
del Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73, (7th Cir. 1994)
(although judges, "like all humans," have "their outlooks ... shaped by their lives'
experiences," they are nevertheless "capable of overcoming those influences and rendering
evenhanded justice").
166. Mcst scholars also do not take this ideal very seriously. Robert A. Ferguson, for
example, makes the point that the most radical critique of the image of the detached
judge-that of the critical legal studies movement-manifests a "more general apprehension"
about this concept in current models of judicial decision-making. Robert A. Ferguson, Law
and Political Culture: Holmes and the JudicialFigure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 513 (1988).
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V. Life Drawn Out of Its Usual Rut: Judicial Calisthenics
The simplifying force of cognition throws into doubt the
endlessly repeated convention that judges maintain an "open mind"
as a means to administer "even-handed" justice. "Open minds"
risk reaffirming and simplifying pre-existing "truths," the hallmark
of closed discourse and the conventional monologic opinion.'67
The challenge, then, is to construct an alternative orientation that
judges can pursue in order to embrace a more polyphonic approach
to decision-making.
The idea of polyphony suggests an alternative, albeit an
unconventional one. Instead of aspiring to a meaningless ideal of
"detachment," judges can, as Bakhtin put it, promote "eccentricity,
the violation of the usual and the generally accepted, life drawn out
of its usual rut." 16 Such a strategy of destabilization would infuse
decision-making with dialogue and experience and thus new
possibilities of meaning.
The following proposals are, in a sense, destabilizing strategies
for the intellect. They originate from diverse sources, including
legal scholars, social psychologists, advocates and judges themselves. In the spirit of polyphony itself, the proposals are necessarily speculative and provisional. Their efficacy is contingent upon,
among many other things, shifting context, individual frames of
reference and practical constraints. Rather than being definitive,
they are themselves a set of possibilities for encouraging a greater
sense of possibility among decision-makers.
A.

Considering the Opposite

Cognitive conservatism entails viewing facts in a manner
congruent to existing beliefs-what social psychologists call "biased
fact assimilation."169 For example, as revealed in his Adarand
dissent, Justice Scalia most likely evaluates arguments in favor of
affirmative action with a hypercritical skepticism because they do
not fit into his monologic view about history and the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.

167. See supra text accompanying notes 159-66.
168. PDP, supra note 12, at 126 (emphasis deleted). See also id. at 105.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
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One potential strategy to overcome this tendency is called
"considering the opposite" or "counterexplanation."' 7 ° The
strategy promotes the systematic consideration of alternative ideas
by turning rigid knowledge structures upside-down.
For example, in one experiment, subjects who had earlier
expressed either support or opposition to capital punishment were
given one study purportedly demonstrating the deterrent effect of
capital punishment and another study purportedly demonstrating
that capital punishment had no such effect. 7' Subjects were told
that they should be "as objective and unbiased as possible" and to
consider themselves "to be in the same role as a judge or juror
asked to weigh all of the evidence in a fair and impartial manner."'172 Nevertheless, subjects interpreted the studies as well
done and convincing in a manner congruent to their prior opinions
on the issue. 73 Indeed, the subjects' review of the studies further
polarized their attitudes.' 74
A "consider the opposite" instruction largely neutralized these
effects.175 This instruction asked subjects to appraise "at each
step whether you would have made the same high or low evaluations had exactly the same study produced results on the other side
of the issue., 176 Such an instruction significantly diminished
attitude-congruent evaluations 178of the study 77 and attitude polarization after reading the study.
In addition, "considering the opposite" not only undermines
overconfidence in the rightness of one's own view, but also
stimulates consideration of a range of alternative views, including
ones not specifically considered in executing the strategy. 7 9
Thus, by destabilizing meaning and turning accepted ways of

170. See generally Lord et al., supra note 144. The usefulness of this strategy is well
established in the experimental literature. See, e.g., Anderson & Sechler, supra note 142;
Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider the Alternative
Strategy for DebiasingJudgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1070 (1995);
Koehler, supra note 142, at 502; Koriat et al., supra note 141, at 107 (demonstrating the
effectiveness of contradictory reasoning during the decision-making process).
171. See generally, Lord et al., supra note 144.
172. Id. at 1233-37 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 1233-34.
174. Id. at 1234-36.
175. Id.
176. Lord et al., supra note 144, at 1233-34.
177. Id. at 1234.
178. Id. at 1236.
179. Hirt & Markman, supra note 170, at 1084.
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viewing legal doctrine on its head, considering the opposite might
serve, as one study put it, to "break the inertia"" and infuse
decision-making with possibility and exploration. 8 '
Despite its potential, however, effective use of a "considering
the opposite strategy" is not an easy process. The strategy requires
active consideration of "opposites" and construction of justifications
for such results."l Given the powerful influence of biased fact
assimilation,183 merely listening or reading opposing arguments,
even with a self-imposed goal of maintaining an "open mind," is
not enough. 8"
Of course, there are a number of ways for judges to "consider
the opposite." One potentially effective but impractical technique
would be to write an opinion that resolves a controversy in a
manner that differs from the likely "decision." A less timeconsuming alternative would be to sketch out opposite results as
opposed to writing them out in a full opinion. However, perhaps
the most realistic way to "consider the opposite" is to incorporate
the essence of the strategy into the very act of writing opinions.
While current opinions typically address alternative analyses in
order to discredit them, 185 writers of opinions should explicitly
draft alternatives and view them as real alternatives. This process
of writing the opposite might serve to destabilize monologic
86
"truths" and thereby expand the scope of what is possible.1

180. Id.
181. See id. In addition, considering the opposite might diminish the tendency of the
monologic judge to assert that the judge has no discretion in reaching a decision because the
law "compels" a given result; this "judicial cannot" often masks the real choices to be made
through a purported (and fictitious) lack of discretion. See supra text accompanying note 79.
See also Horwitz, supra note 8, at 117 (The Supreme Court has increasingly "resort[ed] to
mechanical jurisprudence ...to avoid coming to terms with the deepest challenges that
modernism has presented"); COVER, supra note 7, at 232-36 (describing how pre-Civil War
judges externalized responsibility for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law by claiming
that they were mechanistically applying formal principles).
182. Koriat et al., supra note 141. at 117.
183. See supra text accompanying note 143
184. Koehler, supra note 141, at 467 (demonstrating that subjects have shown greater
overconfidence in relation to tasks involving hypothesis evaluation as opposed to hypothesis
generation).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
186. Of course, time constraints might make this strategy impractical as well. However,
at least as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned, this might be less of a
problem because of declining numbers of cases disposed of by written opinions. Compare
Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 54 U.S.L.W. 3038
(July 30, 1985) (in the 1984-85 term, 170 cases were decided by signed or per curiam
opinions) with Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 64
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B. Identification with Parties
Another strategy would entail active identification with those
affected by litigation. Such identification is neither an easy task
nor commonly recognized as central to the judicial role.1" Nevertheless, such a projection might destabilize "the usual and the
generally accepted" and humanize the impact of judicial decisionmaking. 88
A good example of this strategy is the argument of Homer
Plessy's attorney in Plessy v. Ferguson:189
Suppose a member of this court, nay, suppose every member of
it, by some mysterious dispensation of providence should wake
to-morrow with a black skin and curly hair ... and in traveling
through that portion of the country where the 'Jim Crow Car'
abounds, should be ordered into it by the conductor. It is easy
to imagine what would be the result ... What humiliation, what
rage would then fill the judicial mind!1"
This statement expressly invites the consideration of another
perspective-the perspective of Homer Plessy (or that of
Korematsu which Justice Black found to be "confusing"). Such a

U.S.L.W. 3094 (Aug. 8, 1995)(in the 1994-95 term, 94 cases were decided by signed or per
curiam opinions). Such declining decision calendars might also permit less reliance on the
work of clerks. This is, of course, essential because the strategy is meaningless if clerks write
opinions embodying preordained results.
187. As Robert Cover noted, it is "most uncharacteristic ofjudges, to project [themselves]
into the place of the petitioners." COVER, supra note 7, at 255.
188. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1952 ("[M]ost serious judicial mistakes
result from the judge's inability to empathize with the litigants or their circumstances");
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987) (claiming
that legality and empathy are not mutually exclusive); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges:
Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 1477, 1488-89 (1995)
(calling for judges to engage in "sympathetic imagining" as an aid to decision-making). See
also RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xvi (1989) (calling for
"increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other,
unfamiliar sorts of people" as a means to "make[] it more difficult to marginalize people
different from ourselves by thinking, 'They do not feel it as we would"') (emphasis in
original).
189. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This example is from Minow, supra note 156, at 59-60.
190. Brief for the Plaintiff, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in CIVIL
RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO 298,303-04 (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrando eds., 1968).
Thurgood Marshall employed comparable strategies during oral argument in Brown v. Board
of Education. See ARGUMENT. THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 1952-55, 36-51, 61-68 (Leon Friedman ed.,

1969). For an analysis of Marshall's Brown argument, see Henderson, supra note 187, at
1593-1609.
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perspective might set ideas in motion and lead to a richer conception of meaning. Moreover, this type of projection saves "separate
but equal" and "equal protection of the laws" from hazy abstraction. Although it is, of course, impossible to know the impact of
this specific argument, it is possible that it led Justice Harlan, as the
sole Plessy dissenter, to recognize that the statute at issue was
designed "not so much to ...exclude colored people from coaches

occupied by or assigned to white persons,"'' but as "a badge of
servitude."192
Such empathy was distinctly lacking in the universally
condemned cases of Dred Scott, Buck v. Bell and Korematsu.'93
Such a lack promotes monologic abstraction and vast simplification
which in turn creates a state of affairs that leads to reductionism
that, like Justice Scalia's Adarand concurrence, cannot be right.
C. Expand Life Experience
Polyphony embraces "a participatory orientation" as a means
to intensify dialogue and thereby enrich meaning."
Judges
should therefore reject isolation in favor of an affirmative effort to
experience the unfamiliar. There are at least three possible
strategies that may contribute towards reaching this goal.
1. Attend Court Out of Role.-The bench is physically and
metaphorically above the litigants. Justice Shirley Abrahamson of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court attended court out of role and has
urged other judges to follow suit. 95 She went to court wearing
casual clothes and without identifying herself because she recognized that as "Ms. Justice," she would be treated "royally and
ushered into chambers."' 96 Instead, she found that she was
treated rudely and condescendingly by attorneys and court
personnel alike."

191. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 562.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
194. See supra text accompanying note 43.
195. Shirley S.Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: FourQuestions, 14 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 489, 497-98 (1984). Judith Resnick offers a feminist perspective on this

experience in Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof the Aspirationsfor
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1928-29 (1988).
196. Abrahamson, supra note 195, at 497-98.
197. Id.
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Although entailing difficult (but not insurmountable) problems
for Supreme Court justices whose faces are of course well known,
visits by judges incognito to courtrooms offer an otherwise
unattainable experiential perspective. As Judith Resnick has
written, this exercise will permit judges "to understand more clearly
how much [a judge's] position of power affects her own construction of courtroom reality."' 98
2. Experience the Voices of Others.-In addition, judges could
affirmatively seek out the voices of others. This entails not merely
lecturing, reading, attending conferences or discussing questions
with colleagues."' Rather, the best approach might be to "bring
the world closer and familiarize it in order to investigate it
fearlessly and freely.""
Louis Brandeis suggested such a possible strategy to his
colleague Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes recounted the conversation as follows:
Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with
reference to my summer occupations. He said ["]you talked
about improving your mind, you only exercise it on the subjects
with which you are familiar. Why don't you try something new,
study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in
Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently you can
go to Lawrence [Massachusetts] and get a human notion of how
it really is["]."'

Perhaps Brandeis' idea is more generalizable. Judges might
seek to visit "outsider" neighborhoods not ordinarily part of the
judge's experience. These visits would not be that of a judge; they

198. Resnick, supra note 195, at 1929. This strategy recalls a rich religious and secular
literature in which characters gain wisdom through abrupt changes in social status or
supernatural metamorphoses. See, e.g., APULEIuS, THE GOLDEN Ass (Jack Lindsay trans.,
1962); THE BUDDHIST TRADITION IN INDIA, CHINA AND JAPAN 60-68 (William Theodore
de Bary ed., 1969). Bakhtin also alludes to this idea by describing "the adventure plot" in
Dostoyevsky: "It places a person in extraordinary positions that expose and provoke him,
it connects him and makes him collide with other people under unusual and unexpected
conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the idea." PDP, supra note 12, at 105
(emphasis in original). See also id. at 114-15.
199. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking, and
Acting-Part1-Tentative First Thoughts: How Many Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539
(1994).
200. DI, supra note 14, at 25.
201. 2 HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLACK 1874-1932, 13 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946).
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would be of one human being trying to understand the perspectives
of others. As Brandeis suggested, such visits could be in conjunction with reviewing literature expressing "alien voices," views and
opinions 2with
which the judge is either unfamiliar or had rejected
02
long ago.
Perceptions of these circumstances would, of course, still be
colored by confirmation bias. 3 Nevertheless, even such summary dialogic interaction would, perhaps, contextualize seemingly selfevident2°truths
and help to individuate members of stereotyped
4
groups.
3. Witness Consequences ofJudicialActions. -Judicial acts are
by their nature a kind of legitimized violence; they compel transfers
of money, imprisonment or death.2 5
Understanding these
consequences may promote polyphony by concretizing abstraction
and individualizing the impact of litigation.2 °6
As a practical strategy, justices should thus witness the
consequences of their actions. This might include unannounced
visits to prisons and witnessing executions or evictions. It is, for
example, inconceivable that any informed decision can be made
about whether capital punishment is cruel and unusual without an
202. Matsuda, supra note 52, at 325 (arguing that judges should "study[] ... the actual
experience of black poverty and listen[] to those who have done so"). See also Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1952 (arguing that "counter- or 'saving' narratives could
conceivably serve as strong antidotes to serious moral error"); Rorty, supra note 188, at xvi

("[T]he process of coming to see another human being as 'one of us' rather than as 'them'
...is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalistic report, the
comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, the novel."). However, as Delgado and
Stefancic incisively point out, "outsider" texts are often viewed as "political" because of the
very fact that they are "outsider" texts and thus are not part of the literary canon. Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1955. Of course, the realization that works that are currently
part of the canon were, at one time, viewed as subversive, might provide something of a
deeper sense of the changing context of social reality.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
204. Henderson, supra note 188, at 1650. See also Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at
392 ("It is known that increasing familiarity with a target group increases the likelihood that
representations will be formed around persons or around subgroups rather than around the
broader social level category.") (citations omitted).
205. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
206. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 237-38 (1989) (arguing that the judicial reliance on abstract principles and
failure to be aware of "the hurt of being treated as an outsider who doesn't belong" has
enabled law to be an instrument of social inequality). Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized
Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1157 (1990)
(arguing that "the absence of intercircuit stare decisis" promotes "experiential dialogue by
observing the consequences of different legal rules on the parties affected by such rules").

1996]

THE POLYPHONIC COURTROOM

understanding of what capital punishment actually is and how it
works.2 '7
D. Recognize the Situated Nature of Judges

The monologic tendency operates under a fiction that the
judicial perspective is not bounded and situated, but a way to
pursue an absolute truth.2°8 In contrast, polyphony recognizes
that any decision is, at most, a hypothesis about meaning at one
point in time situated in a continuing dialogue.2°
Put in more prosaic terms, judges and the opinions that they
write should reflect a humility about the complexity of the judicial
undertaking. Doubt, not overconfidence, should be the hallmark
of the search for meaning. Learned Hand proposed one means to
promote doubt: "'I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that
ye may be mistaken.' I should like to have that written over the
portals of every church,
every school, and every courthouse ...in
' 210
the United States.'
Perhaps a more effective strategy is to study the history of the
development of doctrine. Such an investigation would demonstrate
that truths formerly viewed as "self-evident" are embodied in
rhetorically persuasive opinions that, in light of contemporary

207. Judge Alex Kozinski has recently written about his own struggles in coming to terms
with deciding capital cases and his failure to witness an execution:
Though I've now had a hand in a dozen or more executions, I have never
witnessed one .... I sometimes wonder whether those of us who make life-anddeath decisions on a regular basis should not be required to watch as the
machinery of death grinds up a human being. I ponder what it says about me that
I can, with cool precision, cast votes and write opinions that seal another human
being's fate but lack the courage to witness the consequences of my actions.
Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 52.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34, 71-88.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 36-45, 118-31.
210. Lord et al., supra note 144, at 1231 (quoting Judge Learned Hand). The same
sentiment occasionally appears in Hand's judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydocks & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[t]he fact that we are
ourselves not agreed cautions us that we should not be too sure of our conclusion"). This
sentiment resembles the approach of the physicist Richard Feynman:
"Great value of a satisfactory philosophy of ignorance," Feynman jotted on a
piece of notepaper one day, "teach how doubt is not to be feared but welcomed."
This became his credo: he believed in the primacy of doubt, not as a blemish upon
our ability to know but as the essence of knowing.
James Gleick, Introductionto RICHARD FEYNMAN, CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW x (Mod.
Libr. ed., 1994).
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morality, rest on appalling assumptions."1 This highlights the
danger of subordinating complexities into a finely wrought
argument. As Clifford Geertz has noted, "[tjhe force of our
interpretations cannot rest, as they are now so often made to do,
hold together, or the assurance
on the tightness with which they
212
argued.,
are
they
which
with
VI. Conclusion
The judge's voice is one voice, but as the voice with the power
to impose its will, the judicial mission should be to embrace as
many conceptions of meaning as possible. Judges should thus try
to preside over a polyphonic courtroom where equally valid voices
engage in an intense dialogic interaction. Mere desire to do this is
not enough. Rather, judges should seek out extraordinary
intellectual and experiential situations so as to better explode
assumptions and find "new ways to mean." Such an intense
exploration of meaning--enriched with as many ideas, experiences,
and perspectives as possible-might make for a less classically
"persuasive" opinion, but perhaps a richer and truer one.

211. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99. See also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
57, at 1930 ("Because of the particularized stock of life experiences and understandings

judges bring to the bench," even decisions which are later universally condemned "seemed
to their authors unexceptional, natural, 'the truth."').
212. GEERTZ, supra note 1, at 18.

